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12 ANGRYMEN: A REVISIONIST VIEW
MICHAEL AsIMow*
The film 12 Angry Men' has achieved the status of a true classic, par-
ticularly in the law and film canon.2 I am delighted and honored to contrib-
ute this brief essay to a symposium devoted to the fiftieth anniversary of its
release. I am a big fan of the movie, particularly Sidney Lumet's direction
(what an achievement to set an entire film within a stifling jury room-and
this in Lumet's first feature film! 3), Reginald Rose's crackling script, and
the inspired ensemble acting.
12 Angry Men is considered the iconic jury film 4 and it has done more
than any movie, television show, or other cultural work to enshrine the jury
as the central and indispensable element of the American criminal justice
system. 5 For generations of film watchers, Henry Fonda as Juror #8 has
* Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Paul Bergman for his help and
editorial suggestions.
1. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
2. The discerning users of the Internet Movie Data Base rank 12 Angry Men as the 15th best film
of all time. It is far ahead of any other law-related film. To Kill a Mockingbird ranks 42nd. Others
barely made the cutoff of 250: Judgment at Nuremberg comes in 193rd' just ahead of Witness for the
Prosecution (207), Anatomy of a Murder (221), and Inherit the Wind (246). IMDb Top 250,
http://www.us.imdb.com/chart/top (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). For a brilliant treatment of the film (and
of the jury in the courtroom genre), see Carol J. Clover, God Bless Juries!, in REFIGURING AMERICAN
FILM GENRES 255 (Nick Browne ed., 1998). For other thoughtful treatments of the film, see 2 ADAM
GARBICZ & JACEK KLINOWSKI, CINEMA, THE MAGIC VEHICLE: A GUIDE TO ITS ACHIEVEMENTS 297-
99 (1979); STEVE GREENFIELD, GUY OSBORN & PETER ROBSON, FILM AND THE LAW 161 (2001);
THOMAS J. HARRIS, COURTROOM'S FINEST HOUR IN AMERICAN CINEMA 1-21 (1987); TIMOTHY 0.
LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME STORIES 54-66 (2003); Nancy S.
Marder, Why 12 Angry Men? (1957): The Transformative Power of Jury Deliberations, in SCREENING
JUSTICE-THE CINEMA OF LAW 157 (Rennard Strickland, Teree E. Foster & Taunya Lovell Banks eds.,
2006); Peter Robson, The Justice Films of Sidney Lumet, in READINGS IN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE
185 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2006).
3. Lumet had plenty of experience in television direction before making 12 Angry Men. Through
his choices of lenses and camera angles, Lumet made the jury room seem more and more claustropho-
bic as the movie progressed. SIDNEY LUMET, MAKING MOVIES 81 (1995).
4. 12 Angry Men is humorously parodied in JURY DUTY (TriStar Pictures 1995), starring Pauly
Shore. Tommy Collins desperately wants to prolong jury deliberations because he is homeless and he
loves the hotel, free food, and five dollars per day. Thus he holds out in an apparent slam-dunk murder
case. Just in case anybody missed the connection, we see him watching 12 Angry Men on the television
in his hotel room.
5. A survey commissioned by the American Bar Association revealed that 78% of respondents
agreed with the statement "The jury system is the most fair way to determine the guilt or innocence of a
person accused of a crime." Only 12% disagreed. Sixty-nine percent of respondents thought that juries
are the most important part of our judicial system. AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE
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exemplified the heroic anti-conformist juror, a common man standing alone
against the other eleven, changing an 11-1 vote for conviction into a
unanimous and correct verdict of not guilty.6 I would like to suggest a con-
trary reading of the film. In my opinion, the defendant should have been
found guilty.
On one level, the movie serves as an argument against the jury system
because it is so unlikely to be replicated in any real jury room. If one as-
sumes that the defendant should have been acquitted, how often would
such a defendant be fortunate enough to have somebody like Henry Fonda
battling for him in the jury room? How often does one holdout juror turn
the other eleven around? Well, almost never, according to studies of the
jury system. 7 Holding out in these circumstances requires more courage
and tenacity than most of us can muster.8 Indeed, the end of the movie
illustrates this well, as the final holdout jurors crumble, not because they
are convinced the defendant should be acquitted but because of the social
pressure to give in to the emerging consensus.
In the case of an 11-1 split, the usual result is that the one switches
sides, not the eleven. Or, if the one is truly determined, there is a hung
jury.9 The chance of the one changing the view of eleven is remote. Thus
the film hardly serves as a strong argument that the jury can generate a just
result and enforce the high burden of proof imposed on the prosecution
SYSTEM 63 (1999). In contrast, only 30% of respondents had confidence in the U.S. justice system,
32% had confidence in judges, and 14% had confidence in lawyers. Id. at 49.
6. Nancy Marder, for example, regards the film as a "testimonial to the jury system" and "a
tribute to the deliberative process." Marder, supra note 2, at 166.
7. The most famous empirical study of criminal juries was conducted by Kalven and Zeisel.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). Among their findings was that
"with very few exceptions the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict." Id. at 488. The jury's
deliberations after taking the first ballot had no effect on the final verdict in nine of every ten cases.
When there were seven to eleven votes to convict on the first ballot, the ultimate verdict was guilty in
86% of cases, acquittal in 5%, and a hung jury in 9%. This finding shows that the thesis of 12 Angry
Men is unlikely, though not impossible. Where the first vote was lopsided (especially where it was 11-
1), peer pressure almost always forced the holdouts to agree with the majority. Yet Kalven and Zeisel
found that in about 10% of cases, the minority eventually succeeded in reversing the initial majority or
in hanging the jury. However, these ultimately successful minorities usually had four or five votes, not
just one. Generally, when there is a single juror who refuses to budge, the result is a hung jury, not the
eleven changing their votes to join the one. Id. at 488. See generally A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH
(Walter F. Abbot & John Batt eds., 1999).
8. Indeed, holdouts are sometimes kicked off the jury after the other jurors complain to the judge
that they have refused to deliberate. See, e.g., People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225 (Cal. 2001) (holding
that a juror can be excused for refusal to participate in deliberations but not because of disagreement
with the other jurors).
9. See STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302, at 103-06 (2005). Bogira's fascinating book follows
events in a single Chicago courtroom for a year. One case involved a single holdout on a jury who used
Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men as his role model. But he couldn't change anybody's mind and the result
was a hung jury.
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when the rest of the system (prosecutor, defense lawyer, judge) fails to do
its job. Quite the contrary.
What does seem real about the film are the racist, ageist, and classist
views of some of the jurors. Those are the people who are dispensing jus-
tice in the jury room10 and some of them continue to do so, although most
people nowadays have the sense to keep such views to themselves.
On a deeper level, however, I suggest that the jury erred badly. Fonda,
of course, never argued that the defendant was innocent, only that the
prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 While no-
body can say what level of certainty is necessary to surmount the reason-
able doubt hurdle, it is probably around 90% and certainly less than
100%.12 It is in the nature of evidence about a past event that it cannot es-
tablish any proposition with absolute certainty. 13 Eyewitnesses can be mis-
taken or lying. Circumstantial evidence raises an inference, one that could
be incorrect. However, despite the objections raised by the jurors to the
prosecution's case, I believe that the mass of circumstantial evidence pre-
sented against the defendant was overwhelming and the probability that he
10. In To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Brentwood Productions 1962), a racist all-white jury perpetrates
a horrible injustice by convicting a black defendant of a rape of which he was surely innocent. Another
all-white jury does just the opposite in A TIME TO KILL (Regency Enterprises 1996), acquitting a black
defendant who murdered the rednecks who had raped his daughter. The verdict is just as arbitrary and
just as wrong.
I1. The traditional view of the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" appears in Common-
wealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850): Reasonable doubt is "not mere possible doubt;
because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possi-
ble or imaginary doubt." Instead, reasonable doubt exists when the "state of the case.., leaves the
minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral cer-
tainty, of the truth of the charge." Modem restatements of the reasonable doubt rule abandon this quaint
terminology and indicate that the jury must be "firmly convinced" of guilt in order to convict. See FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1988); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing
the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REv. 105,
119-30 (1999) (pointing to empirical evidence showing that jurors are misled by the reasonable doubt
standard and may convict in weak cases).
12. See Solan, supra note 11, at 126 (reporting results of a poll of federal judges).
13. As Justice Harlan wrote,
[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the
factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the
factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened. The intensity of this belief-the
degree to which a factfinder is convinced that a given act actually occurred-can, of course,
vary. In this regard, a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder con-
cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of fac-
tual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. Although the phrases "preponderance of
the evidence" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" are quantitatively imprecise, they do
communicate to the finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of confidence he is
expected to have in the correctness of his factual conclusions.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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killed his father is close to 100%. In other words, the prosecution met and
far exceeded its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.14
The circumstantial evidence against the defendant was overwhelming
and was easily enough to convict by itself, even if one disregards the testi-
mony of the two eyewitnesses. Let's start with the fact that there was no
other known suspect. Who killed the father if it wasn't the defendant? To
find the defendant not guilty, we would have to assume that someone un-
known (with an unknown motive) sneaked into the upstairs apartment soon
after the defendant left for the movies and stabbed the father to death. Yet
there was no sign of a forced break-in and no indication of robbery or theft.
This account is conceivable, of course, but seems highly implausible.
On the night of the murder, neighbors across the hall from the father's
apartment heard the father and son having a fight around 8:00 p.m. and
heard the father hit the defendant twice. The defendant was often physi-
cally punished by the father. Just before the murder, the landlord testified
that he heard the boy say "I'm going to kill you." This item of circumstan-
tial evidence was thrown into some doubt because the words could have
been inaudible. An elevated train was passing at the time the father was
stabbed, and the words could have been spoken during the ten seconds or
so that the train was passing. The fight between father and son and the
physical violence accompanying it provided ample demonstration of mo-
tive. In addition, the defendant had numerous previous brushes with the law
because of violent behavior-generally a pretty good indication that he was
prone to violence.15
The father was killed with an unusual knife identical to a knife pur-
chased by the defendant on the night of the killing. He claimed he lost it
when it fell through a hole in his pocket. This account is highly implausi-
ble. The objections to this evidence raised by Fonda and the other jurors are
far from convincing. True, the knife was not unique because Fonda found
another just like it at the local pawnshop. 16 So what? It was still an unusual
knife and chances that the true killer had one just like it are extremely re-
14. Needless to say, the fact that the most repulsive members of the jury were among the last
holdouts does not mean that their evaluation of the evidence was wrong. We naturally tend to accept the
views of the reasonable and civilized Henry Fonda and the likable jurors who take his side, and we tend
to reject the views of the bigoted or crude jurors. But this is a serious logical error. People with bad
manners and detestable prejudices may still make arguments more logically persuasive than those made
by people with good manners and an absence of prejudices.
15. The jury should not have heard about the defendant's past crimes, particularly not those
committed while a juvenile. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
16. Of course, Fonda's extra-judicial investigation and purchase of the knife was serious juror
misconduct. Had it been called to the judge's attention, Fonda would probably have been kicked off of
the jury. Since the alternates had been dismissed, this would probably have resulted in a mistrial.
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mote (it is even less likely that the real killer picked up the knife after the
defendant lost it and used it to kill the father).
Furthermore, the defendant could not remember anything about the
movie he claimed to have just seen. Fonda attempted to cast doubt on this
evidence by questioning another juror about a movie he had seen days be-
fore. The juror remembered the name and actors of both films in a double
feature, but not perfectly. This "demonstration" hardly diminishes the
strong inference of guilt raised by the fact that the defendant could remem-
ber nothing at all about the movie he claimed to have just seen. And no-
body saw him at the theater. His alibi, therefore, is highly suspect.
Another juror claimed that an experienced knife fighter would not
have stabbed downward with an overhand motion, especially against a
taller victim. But a demonstration quickly dispelled that idea. An overhand,
downward stabbing motion was perfectly possible. The juror claimed that a
switchblade is used for underhanded, upward jabs. Well, perhaps; but per-
haps not. What made the juror such an expert on knife fighting? Regardless
of how switchblade knives were usually used in knife fights, the knife
could have been used either to stab upwards or downwards. The murder did
not occur during a knife fight, so the comparison to knife fighting tech-
nique was of little utility. The knife could easily have been used to stab
downward when the boy impulsively grabbed it from his pocket and struck
out against his father. And, of course, if there were an unknown killer in-
stead of the boy, that person also stabbed downward.
In this view, the testimony of the two eyewitnesses is cumulative and
entirely unnecessary. If you believe either or both of the eyewitnesses, the
probability moves even closer to 100%; if you disbelieve both of them, it
does not reduce the probability below the very high level of certainty al-
ready produced by the circumstantial evidence. The two eyewitnesses were
disinterested and had no motive to lie, but of course, like any eyewitnesses,
they could have been mistaken.
One eyewitness claimed she saw the boy kill his father through the
windows of a moving elevated train. The jurors refuted this testimony be-
cause the witness had little indentations on her nose indicating that she
wore glasses. Because she saw the killing while lying in bed, she wouldn't
have been wearing her glasses, hence could not have identified the boy as
the killer. But perhaps she wore reading glasses or sunglasses, not distance
glasses; or perhaps she was far-sighted. Even if she were near-sighted and
usually wore distance glasses, her vision might still have been good enough
without them to make the identification.
2007]
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The landlord who lived directly below the victim's apartment testified
he rushed to the door of his apartment after he heard the victim's body hit
the floor and somebody start down the stairs. He claims he saw the defen-
dant running down the stairs and out the door. Fonda refuted this by noting
that the landlord was dragging his leg and thus was disabled. It would have
taken the defendant only fifteen seconds to run out the door and down the
stairs, but would have taken the witness forty-one seconds to get from his
bed to the door and open it. Thus he probably saw only the back of the
fleeing killer, not his face. One juror speculated that the landlord embel-
lished his story so that people would pay attention to him for once, but this
was pure guesswork. Fonda makes a fair point here, but it is also possible
the landlord started toward the door as soon as he heard the body fall and
the defendant might have hesitated before running down the stairs, thus
giving the landlord enough time to see the face of the person descending
the stairs.
In short, the jurors do an effective job of casting doubt on the eye-
witness testimony, but I suggest that the probability that the defendant was
guilty, based on circumstantial evidence, was already close to 100%.
Throw out the eyewitnesses, and you are still close to 100%.
12 Angry Men richly deserves its acclaim as a classic of legal popular
culture. It is an inspiring tribute to a common man holding out against
lynch mob mentality. It is also a strong argument that juries can make seri-
ous errors in evaluating evidence. Whether or not we believe in the jury
system as presently constituted, we should not rely on 12 Angry Men as
popular cultural evidence that jury deliberation produces accurate and logi-
cal results.
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